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Judgments

M. Sundaram, Sole Proprietor vs THAYAR' Food Products and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 15 Sep 2014]

M. Janagarajan vs Superintendent of Police, Tiruppur  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 11 Sep 2014]
Service - Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304(b) - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, r. 3(b) - Tamil Nadu Police Standing Orders, rr. 59(4), 59(1) - Dismissal from service - Violation of Principles of natural justice - Petitioner (Head Constable) was charged for offence u/s. 304(b) of IPC for having driven his wife to commit suicide by demanding dowry - Departmental proceedings and on the basis of conviction in criminal case, petitioner was issued with a show cause notice by respondent by invoking u/r. 59(1) of Standing Orders, u/r. 3(c)(i)(1) of Rules and order of dismissal was passed - Hence, instant petition - Petitioner contended dismissal from service on the basis of conviction could not be sustained as it amounts to double jeopardy and conviction order was passed without following the principles of natural justice and was against the Rules -Whether principles of double jeopardy could be applied in the instant case -

Held, r. 59(4) of the Standing Orders stipulates that where an order of dismissal or removal or compulsory retirement is called for as a result of the conviction, such order should be passed immediately on conviction by the first Trial Court and not be postponed till the convicted government servant has exhausted all his rights of appeal to higher Courts. Thus, the respondent is justified in dismissing the petitioner from service after conviction and that order was passed by issuing show cause notice calling for explanation and having regard to the facts of the case, there is no need to conduct enquiry as the factum of conviction is admitted. Earlier charge was u/r. 3(b) of the Rules and the gravaman of the charge was that, by his involvement in the criminal case, he brought disrepute to the police force. The evidence let in and the finding that he ill-treated his wife and drove her to commit suicide was only incidental and the petitioner was charged for having involved in the criminal case that brought disrepute to the police force. The second show cause notice was based on r. 59 of the Standing Orders, which is on a different footing, namely, the conviction in a criminal case. Though he might have been convicted on the same set of facts, the cause of action for both the proceedings are different and the proceedings were initiated on the basis of different rules. It cannot be stated that the subsequent order of dismissal amounts to double jeopardy. Petition dismissed.

Ratio - Where an order of dismissal or removal or compulsory retirement is called for as a result of the conviction, such order should be passed immediately on conviction by the first trial Court and not be postponed till the convicted government servant has exhausted all his rights of appeal to higher Courts.


T. Francis vs District Collector, Tirunelveli District and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 09 Sep 2014]

Kal Cables Private Limited Represented by its Managing Director Vittal Sampathkumaran, Chennai vs Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi and another  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 05 Sep 2014]
Telecom - Practice & Procedure - Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994, rr. 2(c), 11(2) -Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995, ss. 20, 20(2), 4(7), 4(6) - Cancellation of registration - Security clearance - Legality - Petitioner (Multi System Operator, MSO) were engaged in business of securing signals from Television Channels and distributing them through Cable Operators, to the end users - Respondent issued 2 communications by which deemed registration granted on 19-6-2012 in respect of Metropolitan area was cancelled with immediate effect and provisional registration granted in respect of city was also cancelled on the ground that Ministry of Home Affairs denied security clearance to petitioner for registration as a MSO - Thus, respondent directed the petitioner to wind up their operations and switch off signals within a period of 15 days - Aggrieved petitioner filed instant petitions -

Held, MSO can be equated to the local agent of several newspapers, who distributes every morning, two or more newspapers to every household in the neighbourhood. He has nothing to do with the contents of the newspapers. By stopping such a local agent from distributing newspapers in the neighbourhood on the ground of denial of security clearance, no purpose will be served, especially if the very same agents also happen to publish Newspapers and those Newspapers are not banned on the same ground. This example befits the case on hand very well. Security clearance was not indicated as a pre-condition for registration u/s. 4 of the Act as it stood before the amendment of the year 2011. But, s. 20(2) of the Act which was inserted under Amendment Act 36 of 2000 empowered the Government to regulate or prohibit the transmission or retransmission of any channel or programme, in the interest of the security of India. The Act never linked a MSO with the security concerns of the State, till the year 2011 and the Act did not provide either for refusal of registration (u/s. 4 of the Act) or for cancellation of registration (u/s. 20 of the Act) of a MSO on that basis. What was provided u/s. 20(2) of the Act with effect from 1-9-2000 was only a power to regulate or prohibit the transmission of a channel or programme and not the cancellation of registration of a Multi System Operator. Govt. should spell out clearly whether such acts as revealed in the file would constitute security and if so, the same yardstick would apply at all levels, not only against MSO but also against the Television channels. There cannot be two different security standards, one for MSO and another for TV Channels. Central Government should have applied its mind to the question whether such abuses and corrupt practices constitute an affront to the security of the State or not, to enable the second respondent to deny security clearance. Petitioner is denied security clearance because of the fact that its promoters have come to adverse notice, in the perception of the Ministry of Home Affairs. If that perception is actually genuine and bonafide, the first thing that they would have done is to take recourse to s. 20(2) of the Act against the television channels promoted by the very same persons, as their role in society is much larger than the role of a mere MSO. Noting made by the concerned Officials, in the File produced before Court by the Ministry of Home Affairs, conclude that there are no adverse reports against the Directors/Key Executives of the petitioner company, from the security point of view. If the information available in the file about the alleged activities of the promoters of the petitioner company, is not considered to be a ground for invoking s. 20(2) of the Act against the Television channels promoted by the very same persons, Court do not know how the same information would disentitle the petitioner from getting a security clearance just for the continuance of registration as a MSO, whose role is very very limited and smaller than that of a commercial Television channel; and if for suspending or revoking the registration of a cable operator u/s. 4(7) of the Act, an opportunity of hearing is to be granted, then the respondent cannot avoid such a liability especially when s. 4(7) of the Act does not make a distinction between general conditions imposed u/s. 4(2) of the Act and additional conditions relating to security of the State imposed u/s. 4(6) of the Act. Impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Petitions allowed.

Ratio - If there is a perspective in the thinking of the Govt. that it is not in the interest of the security of the country to give clearance for a project, the power of judicial review over the said decision, is almost equivalent to nothing.


R. Sivakumar vs IDBI Bank Limited, Represented by its Branch Head, Commercial Banking, Chennai and another  [STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, 05 Sep 2014]

A. Gnanasundari W/o Aruna Bharathi vs J. Jeyakumar S/o V. Jayaraman  [STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, 05 Sep 2014]

T. R. Subramanian vs Income Tax Officer, Pudukkottai  [INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, 04 Sep 2014]

M. Chadacharam vs Commissioner of Central Excise, Madurai  [CUSTOMS EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, 03 Sep 2014]

M. Masood vs Parisal Beevi  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 03 Sep 2014]

K. Muthuveni vs Secretary, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, Chennai and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 03 Sep 2014]
Service - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, s. 2(rr) - Tamil Nadu Government Fundamental Rules, rr. 54-B1(1), (3), (4) and (9) - Suspension period - Full pay and allowances - Entitlement - Appellant (petitioner) filed writ petition seeking direction to respondents to pay her full backwages for suspended period according to s. 2(rr) of the Act - Single Judge dismissed petition holding that order of punishment and order of regularization passed by respondent no. 2 were not challenged by petitioner - Hence, instant appeal - Appellant contended that subsistence allowance was not a part of the pay as held in several decisions and that same could not be adjusted or deducted from full pay and allowances -

Held, fundamental rule clearly provides that the period of suspension in case of revocation or reinstatement shall be treated as a period spent on duty. The entitlement of the employee to full pay and allowance is based on the principle that the period of suspension which has been subsequently revoked and employee has been directed to be reinstated, be treated as a period spent on duty and as such the employee is not entitled to full pay and allowance excluding the subsistence allowance. Thus, the contention of the appellant cannot be countenanced. The subsistence allowance is not an allowance in legal sense, but part payment of pay during the period of suspension as is clear from the provisions of Rule 53 of the Fundamental Rules. S. 2(rr) of the Act does not grant any benefit to appellant, firstly, on the ground that it does not stipulate that the subsistence allowance is excluded from 'wages' and secondly, the appellant has not claimed the benefit as a workman under the provisions of the Act. Court do not find any error in impugned order. Appeal dismissed.


Navab John vs S. Aariyakannan and another  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 03 Sep 2014]

Selvi N. Krishnaveni vs District Elementary Educational Officer, Pudukottai and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 03 Sep 2014]

R. Siddiah and others vs State of Tamil Nadu Represented by its Secretary to Government Revenue Department (ULC.2-1), Chennai and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 03 Sep 2014]

R. Babu Proprietor, Shree Sakthi Vinayagar Poo Kadai, Erode vs Arulmigu Sakthi Vinayagar Kovil, Represented by its Executive Officer, Erode  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 03 Sep 2014]

Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Company Limited, Cuddalore vs S. Chidakasan and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 02 Sep 2014]

Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corporation Limited, Chennai vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 02 Sep 2014]

D. Dhavamani vs Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 02 Sep 2014]

Gayatri Balaswamy vs ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, Represented by Chairman of the Board, Sucons Oki Info Park E34, IT Highway, Chennai and another  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 02 Sep 2014]

Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited, Represented by its Senior Branch Manager, Viskhapatnam Steel Plant, Chennai vs Union of India owning South, Eastern Railway, Represented by its General Manager, Kolkatta and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 02 Sep 2014]

Sarna Transport Corporation Private Limited, Represented by its Authorised Signatory C. Isakkimuthu vs Commercial Tax Officer, Roving Squad IV, Enforcement (North), Chennai  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 02 Sep 2014]

Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Villupuram Limited, Kancheepuram vs V. Nadarajan and another  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 02 Sep 2014]

Murugan Mills vs Commissioner of Central Excise, LTU, Chennai  [CUSTOMS EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, 01 Sep 2014]

N. Rajkumar vs Manager, Vijaya Bank, Rangarajapuram Branch, Chennai and another  [STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, 28 Aug 2014]

Sakthi Fashions, Manufacturers and Exporters of Fabrics and Garments, Represented by its Proprietrix K. R. Vasanthi, Chennai vs Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited, Represented by its General Manager, Chennai Metro Branch, Mumbai  [STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, 28 Aug 2014]

P. M. P. Arts and Science College Represented by its Secretary, Thokkampatty vs Director of Town and Country Planning, Chennai and others  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 28 Aug 2014]



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